

ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS LIMITATIONS, NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE ROLE OF EUROPE IN THE WORLD.

**Essay by Sergio Pistone on the XXII National Congress of the MFE
Forlì, 11th-13th March 2005**

On May 1st 2004, with the E.U.'s admission of a further 8 states from Eastern and Central Europe as well as Malta and Cyprus, we now have a Europe of 25 nations. This will become 27 with the expected adhesion in 2007 of Romania and Bulgaria. There is also a number of other countries queueing up to join, including Turkey, and it looks like we are facing an apparently unstoppable enlargement process which fails to specify a point of arrival. Enlargement is certainly a demonstration of the enormous appeal of the E.U. and, therefore, its success, and this opens up the prospective of expanding to whole of Europe the process of pacification and the economic, social and democratic progress which was initiated by the Union's founding states. On the other hand, it represents a challenge of enormous dimensions which poses in no uncertain terms the problem of the complete federalisation of the E.U., but one which also requires that further questions are clarified, such as E.U. borders, relations with neighbouring regions (particularly Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Middle East and North Africa) and the role of Europe and the world stage. One must therefore strive to define, with regard to such questions, a series of coherent and systematic guidelines. Let us start with the general framework regarding the effective candidates for adhesion, the potential ones those countries whose adhesion is under discussion (1).

The Queue

Let us start with the *effective candidates*. Other than Romania and Bulgaria, who should join in 2007, there is Turkey, with whom Brussels agreed, on December 16th and 17th, to open adhesion negotiations on October 2nd 2005. The final outcome of such negotiations will be the source of much controversy among the other member states and it is thought that they will not be concluded before the establishment of the 2014-2020 financial framework.

Moving on to the *potential candidates*, it should be stated that this term has assumed an almost official connotation with specific reference to the western Balkan region. However, it can also be extended to the western European countries who are not already part of the E.U., and these are the countries I will consider first. They are the four member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Three of them, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, are already part of the European Economic Area (EEA), which is an association agreement with the E.U. implying the creation of a free trade area with the extension of the four freedoms of circulation (goods, people, capital and services) and the possibility to participate in certain common policies. With regard to Switzerland, it refused to participate in the EEA after a referendum in 1992, but subsequently signed a series of bilateral agreements with the E.U. which are effectively making the country part of the EEA. It should be remembered that Norway and Iceland, together with the other Scandinavian countries in the Nordic Council, are also part of the Schengen area and Switzerland is currently negotiating entry into this group.

The problem regarding the adhesion of the EFTA countries to the E.U. (Switzerland is still officially a candidate even though negotiations have been suspended since the 1992 referendum) is really only a matter of the will of the countries in question assuming the said

countries have already forged close links with the E.U. and that they would not have any trouble satisfying the admission criteria established by the European Council of Copenhagen on June 21st - 22nd 1993, which are as follows: stable institutions capable of guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of minorities; - a functioning market economy able to sustain competition and market forces; - the ability to assume and fulfill the obligations required to belong to the European Union (to accept the *acquis* of the E.U.) and adhere to the objectives of economic, monetary and political union.

The situation regarding the western Balkans, i.e. the countries of the former Yugoslavia but without Slovenia (which became part of the E.U. in 2004) and with Albania is more complex. These countries have been considered potential candidates since 2000, after the restoration of democracy in Serbia and the launch of the CARDS programme (Programme for Assistance, Recovery, Development and Stabilisation), aimed at financially assisting the western Balkans in their reconstruction, including the creation of a new institutional and legislative framework (assistance in democracy), social and economic development, reforms relating to the introduction of a market economy, and international and cross-border cooperation between Balkan countries and their European Union neighbours or those applying for inclusion. Initially, the E.U. had expressed a preference for a collective approach founded on the prior condition of resolving territorial conflicts and the development of cooperation within the region, given that lasting peace did not seem possible without complete agreement between Croatia and Serbia, with the subsequent stabilisation of Bosnia Herzegovina. But the pacification process after the fall of the dictatorships, and the development of Croatia after the reforms introduced in 2000, have opened the way towards a more differentiated approach.

In reality, Croatia deposited its official application in February 2003 and the Commission expressed an opinion in which the two preliminary conditions necessary to open negotiations (which could begin in 2005 and be concluded in 2007) are better cooperation on the part of the Croat government with the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, and the regulation of border disputes with Slovenia (which has the right of veto on new adhesions now that it is a member state). That leaves another five states and a potential one. Serbia, Montenegro (which is part of the Serbia-Montenegro federation, but in fact a sovereign state), Bosnia Herzegovina (which is subject to an international protectorate established by the UN and fundamentally sustained by the military, police and financial resources of the EU), Macedonia (which deposited its official application for admission in 2004, but subject to a softer international protectorate, in which the EU is at the forefront in the framework of the *Concordia* operation which began in 2003), Albania (in which the maintenance of the rule of law was initiated in 1997 by the Italian Army, subsequently replaced by a multinational assistance force aiding the police, organised within the framework of the WEU). The potential state is Kosovo. After NATO's war against Serbia in 1999, the country has been placed under an international protectorate in which the EU intervenes under the jurisdiction of a higher civil authority nominated by the UN, possessing executive power and promulgating declaring regulations and administrative instructions. There has not yet been official recognition of Kosovo's independence (which would set a dangerous precedent encouraging the proliferation of further small monoethnic states, particularly in the Caucasus area), but it is likely that a solution of sovereignty will prevail, with the handing over of small part of the region (to the north of Mitrovica) to the Serbian state.

The decision to consider the western Balkan states as potential candidates depends on the fact that the EU cannot accommodate states that (apart from the case of Croatia) do not control either their borders or their economies and are not currently capable of assuming all the obligations deriving from admission. Even if there is a favourable tendency towards their admission and to extend to them the benefits of pacification and economic, social and

democratic progress given by European integration, it seems inevitable that a lengthy preparatory period will be required. In any event, due to Europe's inability to prevent the break-up of Yugoslavia, we are left with the medium term prospect of integrating eight separate countries rather than two, which would have been Yugoslavia and Albania.

Other than the potential candidates, there are further countries on the waiting list on which discussions are open with regard to whether or not they should be considered for admission. They belong to two regions: the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) and the countries in the South and East Mediterranean.

As far as the CIS is concerned, we are currently witnessing the development of two contrasting tendencies. On the one hand, there is the push by the Russian Federation to consolidate the CIS (a rather weak confederation) in direction of a model of integration formally inspired by that of the EU., but which in reality possesses neoimperial characteristics. This design is coming up against some extremely arduous obstacles (especially with regard to the European and Transcaucasian members of the CIS), due both to serious deficiencies in the Russian state from a political, democratic and administrative point of view (therefore not in a good position to attract and retain members), and to the fear deriving from Russia's imperialist traditions. On the other hand, some of the CIS members are strongly attracted to the E.U and this attraction is particularly encouraged by the USA and by certain central-eastern European countries which have just entered (namely Poland and the Baltic states) or are about to enter (Romania, for example). This is true for the Ukraine (especially after the orange revolution and Yushenko's victory), Moldova (inhabited by a Romanian majority), Georgia (especially after a popular vote ousted Shevardnadze) and Armenia. It should also be noted that the prospect of Turkish admission tends to strengthen the push towards the E.U. There is no push towards the E.U., however, in Belarus (dominated by a neostalinist regime, though the situation could change), in Azerbaijan or in the central asiatic republics.

The E.U. finds itself faced with some very difficult choices. It is currently following the line of the TACIS aid programme (Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent States), as well as the strategy for Russia and the neighbourhood policy, which are aimed at the development and stabilisation of Russia and the CIS members, gradually extending the EEA towards them and assisting them in the construction of a modern democratic state. The guiding objective has been officially declared as the sharing of "all but institutions". This seems to be receptive to the idea of consolidating the CIS, accepting Russia's leading role in the former Soviet Union with the exception of the Baltic countries. At the same time, a domino effect seems to be proliferating inexorably towards the imposition of an acknowledgement of certain CIS countries' vocation towards adhesion to the E.U. This would lead to a situation of conflict with Russia (and the serious risk of further destabilisation of this country) and the prospect of integrating multinational states with internal situations similar to those of the western Balkan countries. Finally, it should be remembered that there are voices (from Brzezinski to Berlusconi) which foresee the integration of Russia itself into the E.U., as an inevitable step on the road to modernisation.

Moving onto the South and East Mediterranean countries, again with the Barcelona process and the MEDA (Mediterranean Actions) programme, in whose framework it was recently decided to institute a parliamentary assembly along the lines of the EU-ACP, progress and stability in the region is being pursued with a strategy fundamentally linked to the "everything but the institutions" principle. However, there are also states in this context in which a vocation towards adhesion to the E.U. is apparent – a tendency that the prospect of

Turkish adhesion undoubtedly encourages. The states in question are Morocco and Israel, but could yet extend to Tunisia, the Lebanon and the future Palestinian state.

As can be seen, the enlargement issue (and the related neighbourhood policy) is one of considerable dimensions and gives the E.U. some extremely complex decisions to make. It is no longer possible to play by ear, on the contrary, clear and rigorous criteria and guidelines are needed. To define them, it is necessary to start with a vision of the role of Europe on the world stage.

Europe and the the World

The conviction that European unification should be seen as a fundamental moment or stage on the road to the unification of the world has always constituted a basic foundation of the European Federalist Movement's (EFM) doctrine, and it was translated by the Congress of Bari in 1980 into an effective slogan "unite Europe to unite the world". The element of novelty that has emerged in recent years – that have witnessed the formal adhesion of the Union of European Federalists (UEF) to the World Federalist Movement (WFM) – is represented by a by the evolution of the world situation which has rendered concrete the *necessity on the part of the EU to initiate a policy of world unification*.

One the one hand, the crucial challenges emerging from the cataracts of globalisation – world poverty, migration on a biblical scale, fundamentalist reaction, cross-border terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, states that collapse, ecological emergencies, destructive economic and financial crises – can only find long term solutions in policies oriented towards the gradual building of a peaceful and democratic system of world government. This type of policy is one in which the driving force can only be the world's great democracies. Not only do they have vital interests in such a policy, given that the democratic system cannot survive in an increasingly interdependent world and heading towards exaggerated and generalised states of conflict with no obvious escape routes, but they also have the material resources (economic, technological, capability of international action) and the ethical and political ones (only the democracies founded on the constitutional limitation of power are structurally capable of accepting consensual limits on external power, and they are the also the ones currently home to the largest movements for peace and international justice) necessary for the implementation of a policy aimed at the construction of international democracy.

On the other hand, a policy of world unification has certain costs in terms of progressive limitations on sovereignty and privileges linked to a macroscopic injustice in the distribution of world resources (20% of the world's population controls 80% of its resources), and the idea of paying such costs is refused by the American political class owing to the fact that no counterweight exists to its power. From this derives the imperial and hegemonic type of response – founded on systematic unilateralism, military power (American military expenditure now amounts to more than half of total world expenditure) and untamed liberalism – to the problems of world government, with consequences which tend to increase levels of instability. Therefore, there is an increasingly urgent necessity for the EU to become an effective player on the world stage, completing its process of federalisation, in comparison to which the ratification (if it gets that far) of the European Constitution will represent a stepping stone, an important one, but one from which Europe must forward immediately. A fully federal E.U. would indeed be capable of effectively expressing its vocation towards a policy of world unification and of involving the US in the process. It would thus be able to

act as a counterweight to American power, forming an organic relationship between equals and opening the way towards a multipolar cooperative system (2).

The policy of world unification must hold as its guiding principle the design (of historical dimension) of constructing an articulate world federal system based on the subsidiarity principle, with continental federations, nation states, regions and local authorities as its basic structures. Federalism is, in effect, the only institutional system capable of creating a democratic government of interdependency. With this in mind, there must be concrete approaching strategies in which to operate for the policy of world unification to be truly productive. There are essentially two complementary paths which should be followed simultaneously.

The first path consists of a commitment to export the experience of European integration throughout the world as a model of pacification and economic, social and democratic progress. This commitment would obviously favour regional integration, which is the best way to pacify areas in conflict (with the consequently drastic limitation of authoritarian tendencies and military expenditure) and to form economic systems that surpass the suffocating dimensions of small states, satisfy the economic and social prerequisites for democracy and that are able to effectively defend their interests within the context of a world economy. In a wider sense, this commitment would also include a policy aimed at favouring the stabilisation and democratisation of large states which already have continental dimensions, such as Russia and China, but which are certainly not great democratic federations. India on the other hand is to a certain extent, but it still presents some relevant signs of lagging behind. In essence, if European integration represents a grandiose experiment (which has yet to be concluded, but which already provides a highly educational and attractive case study) of *state-building*, i.e. the construction of a democratic state, such an experience simply needs to be generalised. This means making concrete strides towards a more peaceful and progressive world, while at the same time building the fundamental framework for future world federation.

The second fundamental path to take for a successful world unification policy is represented by the refoundation and strengthening of international global organisation. Although there are clearly fundamental problems which must be addressed on a global level, it is not possible to achieve such profound integration as is possible on a regional scale, where greater interdependence, relative proximity and cultural common ground make cross-national federally orientated institutions possible, if still difficult, to achieve. One must also take into account that on a world level, states which are not yet democratic need to be involved. Nevertheless, it is both possible and necessary to introduce reforms which will have a great effect on international global organisation, applying tools which confront much more effectively problems of safety and security on economic, military and ecological levels, as well as the issue of the globalisation of human rights, creating in particular an institutionalisation (through some form of world taxation) of solidarity between rich and poor countries.

The two pillars of world unification policy summarised above are organically related, in the sense that they mutually strengthen each other. This relationship appears to be particularly clear with regard to the reforms of the UN Security Council, in which existing continental states and the institutions promoting regional integration processes should all be present, starting naturally with the European example.

In the context of world unification policy there are two aspects which must be underlined and which have particular relevance with respect to enlargement and neighbourhood policy issues. One is *interregionalism*, or rather a policy which is not only

aimed at encouraging regional integration from the outside, but also at the institutional cooperation of the E.U. with other regional areas (especially those nearby), in such a way as to be able to favour their integration and progress more effectively. The second is *dialogue with the Muslim world* which must strive to oppose the prospect of the clash of civilisations, favouring the modernising tendencies of Islam over fundamentalist and obscurantist elements. The importance of such orientation in the fight against terrorism and in global pacification is clear.

Finally, it should be underlined that the design of the European world unification policy, which has been briefly outlined here, does not correspond to an essentially voluntary choice (although this is an element that must be present), but is intended as an effort which aims to clarify and make more organic and coherent tendencies which are already partially in progress and reflect a European vocation which has an objective basis. This is also demonstrated by the document "A Safe Europe in a Better World" (compiled by the High Representative of the CFSP, Solana, and approved by the European Council on December 12th 2003), in which a policy in favour of regional integration and the strengthening of the UN is outlined, though not in a sufficiently comprehensive manner. In effect, orientation towards European nationalism or fortress Europe (which is dreaded in certain pacifist contexts and sometimes also in the federalist debate) would have its objective foundations in a confederal-hegemonic type of unification supported by Carl Schmitt (3).

Enlargement and the Neighbourhood Policy

From the vision of the EU's role on the world stage outlined above, certain basic criteria can be drawn which should influence the process of enlargement, its limits and the neighbourhood policy.

Above all, it should be noted that enlargement obviously constitutes a fundamental contribution to the process of world unification, given that it introduces pacification, modernisation and the peaceful extension of democracy in a crucially important area of the world, and which acts as a model for other regions and the world as a whole. Enlargement, however, cannot continue without certain limitations, because the EU's peace policy must aim to give rise to other poles of peace (through regional integration) and must not favour instability in nearby areas. Therefore, it is right that we support the accession of the EFTA countries as well as those in the western Balkans, in the knowledge that a long preparatory period will be necessary for the latter. This process could be accelerated if *the option of territories being administered for a transitional period directly by the central authority of the EU* was introduced, as in the case of Canada and the United States before 1960.

Moreover, it is also important that Turkey's accession is supported, although the reasons for this choice must be well clarified (4). The fundamental point is that Turkey's entry into the European system of peace, democracy and social market economy would generate positive effects not only in the country in question but also with regard to the conflict (vitally important as regards the progress on a world scale) between modernising tendencies and fundamentalist, backward tendencies (which feed transnational terrorism) in the Muslim world, as well as on the stabilisation process going on in the Middle East. Without the prospect of European membership, Ankara would remain a prisoner of its internal political, economic and social imbalances, as well as Muslim fundamentalism, which is currently on the increase, and regional hegemonic tendencies towards the Middle East and central Asia fed by populations of Turkish extraction living alongside Kurd and other ethnic minorities. Turkey in the EU would on the other hand be an example of the successful

acceptance by a Muslim country of laical democracy and the possible coexistence of different faiths and cultures, with positive effects on middle eastern society and its relations with Israel. A European and developing Turkey could provide the Union with a gateway to all its bordering territories, namely Iran, Iraq, Syria and Southern Caucasus. Naturally, Turkey will only be admitted to the EU, something which is in its own interests as well as those of the other member states, if strong constitutional and federal guarantees are given with regard to religious freedom, the rights of minorities, and within the context of the federalisation of foreign, security and defence policies, thus making it possible to leave behind the authoritarian tendencies associated with the Turkish State Army. Furthermore, the EU must be able to design and conduct an effective neighbourhood policy towards the Middle East and the Mediterranean region, something which we will come back to later.

Let us move on now to examine the cases of the countries for which the jury is still out with regard to a possible application to join the E.U.

Starting with the CIS countries, we have seen the dilemma facing the E.U. and now we must strive to find a valid response. In this regard, the major interest that the E.U. has in the democratic, social and economic development of Russia should be emphasised. If the country fails to make progress in this regard (which would, among other things, allow questions such as that of Chechnya to be addressed, abandoning the imperial repression path while avoiding the destructive alternative of small, monoethnic states), we could be looking at a break-up that would make what happened in Yugoslavia look like child's play (5). The modernisation of Russia would also make the transformation of the CIS into a democratic federation a conceivable process, which the European peace policy of world unification would have every reason to encourage, both because it would be a decisive factor for progress and stabilisation within the region and because it would give life to a regional pole oriented towards world unification. The road towards the consolidation of the CIS, however, is not without its pitfalls, other than the relative backwardness of Russia, one must consider the attitudes of countries like the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, who fear Russia's imperialist tendencies and see membership of the E.U. as the best way forward. Favouring the admission of these countries to the E.U., however, would not only compromise any chance of consolidating the CIS, but it would also in all probability have a destabilising effect on Russia. In this extremely intricate situation, my view is that the best and most constructive solution must be found in the E.U.'s ability to transform the hesitant neighbourhood policy into a grand design for interregional cooperation.

In essence, the strategy – through the TACIS programme, the neighbourhood policy and the strategy for Russia – of enlarging the EEA to include the CIS must be strengthened, and greater resources must be allocated to it (so that economic incentives to follow EU rules are more attractive). It must also be integrated with more extensive cooperation than is presently taking place with the CIS in areas such as human rights, the protection of minorities, support in the construction of democratic institutions and efficient administrations, foreign policy and national security. *The fundamental tool required to implement this extended economic and political cooperation would be a genuine confederation (resuming and updating Mitterand's old idea) between the E.U., operating as a single entity, and the CIS countries.* This Euro- Asiatic confederation would absorb the Council of Europe and would be accompanied by a reform of NATO (something which should definitely be top of the agenda), with a view to merging it with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Such an organisation should be founded on three pillars: North America, the EU and the CIS.

Within this framework, the following would be possible:

- to surpass Russia's current "siege" situation and positively influence its movement towards modernisation;
- to decisively favour the modernisation of other CIS countries, particularly those in Europe and South Caucasus, moving beyond a straight choice between membership of the E.U. and subordination towards an authoritarian and imperial Russia;
- to subsequently favour the transformation of the CSI into a democratic federation.

It should be added that within the framework of a confederation between the EU and the CIS, *areas of transnational cooperation, involving countries belonging to the two regions*, could be institutionalised. One might consider the Black Sea region, for example, the Baltic region, the Barents Sea or the Danube basin. In the framework of the E.U. (including enlargement towards the eastern and western Balkans), such transnational cooperation areas could be regions such as the Alps, the Adriatic Sea and the Balkans.

It is evident that the interregional EU-CIS cooperation outlined here would be extremely arduous and its achievement would be by no means certain. It is based on the assumption that the EU is able to act effectively on an international scale and relies on its ability to effectively favour the modernisation of Russia, which is certainly no easy task. On the other hand, one must be aware that the necessity to stabilise Russia and the CIS is of vital importance to the EU, which must however aim high if it wants to be up to the challenges ahead. It can also be observed that an EU-CIS confederation would constitute the best framework in which, in the event that Russia fails to make progress towards modernisation, the enlargement of the EU towards the CIS countries could be addressed.

Now let us come to the South East Mediterranean Region, where the situation is rather similar to that of the CIS. Here too, progress and stability within this region is of crucial importance to the EU, considering issues like international terrorism, endemic conflict, energy supply, immigration, pollution of the Mediterranean. The tools used so far by the EU, however, have been largely ineffective. The MEDA programme, for example, is vaguely aimed at the creation of a free trade area in the Euro-Mediterranean area, but it is incapable of favouring integration among the South East Mediterranean countries themselves. Such integration is essential in order to generate rapid and balanced development in these countries, partly because foreign investment is not attracted by small, closed markets. On the other hand, the situation in the Middle East is currently left to America's imperial-style management, whose consequences are there for all to see. Furthermore, all evidence seems to suggest that arguments for the adhesion of individual countries to the EU, like Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Lebanon and the future Palestinian state are somewhat insubstantial.

In reality, if one wishes to seriously address the issue of the South East Mediterranean, it is necessary to formulate, yet again, a grand design of interregional cooperation, which should assume the configuration of a *Euro-Mediterranean Confederation* in which the EU would act as a single entity. This entity would have responsibilities in sectors such as economics, ecology, security and cooperation for the achievement of democratic institutions, human and minority rights and efficient administrations. The fundamental objectives of a Euro-Mediterranean confederation should be: the transnational integration of the North African region, which would constitute a contribution and a stimulus with respect to the more general objective of a united Africa (which the EU must vigorously support and the progress of which can only be helped by sub-continental integration); the transnational integration of the Middle Eastern region, as a framework for peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Arabs and for democratic, economic and social progress throughout the region; increasingly profound cooperation between the EU and South Eastern Mediterranean countries to effectively safeguard the Mediterranean region as a whole.

In order to realise such a grand design, the EU must be willing to invest considerable resources on both an economic and security level. In essence, it must launch a Marshall Plan, which subjects significant economic aid to the choice of peaceful, transnational integration and democratic progress. Furthermore, the EU must be ready to deploy long term security forces in the Middle East in order to make a decisive contribution to making Israel and Palestine secure and thus creating the conditions for their reconciliation (which would have a similar value to that of the reconciliation between France and Germany with respect to European integration). In order to create a Euro-Mediterranean confederation, collaboration with the USA is essential, as it is for the formation of an EU-CIS confederation. Such collaboration, however, can only be obtained by an EU which takes the necessary federal decisions to emancipate it from the American protectorate, to create a counterbalance able to harness the unilateralism, militarism and untamed liberalism of American imperial democracy, and to make Europe a decisive player in the construction of international democracy.

Institutional Aspects

Enlargement (which in the case of the western Balkans could mean direct transitional administration of certain territories on the part of the EU), interregional cooperation projects and the role that Europe is called on to play on a world scale require, as has been said several times before, the complete federalisation of the EU, i.e. its transformation into a federal state. To this end, the ratification of the European Constitution is essential, and it is necessary to impose its introduction among those countries who vote for it if not all member states accept it. It is clear, on the other hand, that work should begin immediately on its revision in a fully federal sense, surpassing the national right of veto in areas such as CFSP, ESDP, finances and constitutional revision, eliminating the right of secession. In this context, the question of *federal vanguard* must be posed.

The theory according to which the six founder members should form a federal state open to the subsequent adhesion of the other member states is an inadequate response to a real problem. In this regard, I would like to outline a number of considerations.

- Within a framework limited to the six founder members, the push towards federation would clearly be weaker, given that they are more homogenous and as such they have less need to stay together to overcome intergovernmental structures. It is no coincidence that when in France (which is clearly the decisive country for the progress of European integration) they speak of consolidating a hard core of founder members, they systematically hypothesise links of an intergovernmental nature.
- In a wider framework which tends to enlarge further, there are strong differences and a pluralism which can only be made to coexist in the long term with strong federal institutions, in the absence of which integration is destined to fail.
- In effect, enlargement has generally led to deepening, with respect to which the founder members have been the driving force (given that they were involved in the crisis of the nation state to a greater extent), and they have developed specific knowledge of the advantages of integration and a more deep-rooted pro-European tradition.
- The weaker countries, especially the most recent additions to the Union, although they appear defensive at times of their national sovereignty, have deeply vested interests in federal development which is the only way to guarantee strong economic and social cohesion and to avoid directories. For this reason, if the founder members demonstrate a willingness to

progress towards the complete federalisation of the EU, they will be followed by the vast majority of the other member states.

Therefore, the federal vanguard strategy must impose the option of majority ratification of the Constitution, implement structured cooperation in the ESDP and above all promote – and here the European Parliament, stimulated by the federalist struggle, would have a decisive role, and would also have to stimulate the initiative of the more advanced governments – the revision of the Constitution with those who wish to adhere to it, imposing a constituent convention and the principle of introducing forthcoming revisions in a federal sense provided that they are ratified by the majority of the states and by the majority of the EU's total population, with the states having voted against retaining the possibility of joining when they are willing to do so. It should be underlined that these choices are linked to the European Constitution, but they imply the political will to interpret it in an evolutionary manner. The federal vanguard strategy implies on the other hand that the problem of a Europe of concentric circles or of variable institutional geometry (which currently finds partial application in EMU) must be fully addressed. This problem is evidently becoming increasingly important, also given the prospect, mentioned earlier, of interregional cooperation and transnational cooperation areas. It is therefore essential that we confront it comprehensively and creatively.

NOTES

1) Useful texts in this regard include : Jean-François Drevet, *L'élargissement de l'Union Européenne, jusqu' où?*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2004; Alain Réguillon, *Quelles frontières pour l'Europe? Europe-puissance ou Europe-marché?*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2004; Enrico Letta, *L'Europa a venticinque. Dalla Turchia al supereuro: le nuove sfide dell'Europa*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2004; Susan Stern & Elisabeth Seligmann (edited by), *Desperately seeking Europe*, published by Alfred Herrhausen Society for International Dialogue, Archetype Publications, London, 2003.

2) I refer the reader to my writings: *L'unificazione europea e la pace nel mondo*, in Umberto Morelli (edited by), *L'Unione Europea e le sfide del XXI secolo*, Celid, Turin, 2000, e *The Aims of the European Foreign Policy and the Features of its Defence System*, in "The Federalist", 2004, n. 2.

3) Four texts are recommended here that, although lacking a rigorous vision of institutional aspects, they put the orientation of the EU towards a policy of world pacification in a very clear light: Jürgen Habermas, *L'Occidente diviso*, Laterza, Bari, 2004; Michael Walzer, *Arguing about War*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 2004; Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream*, Penguin Group, 2004; Tzvetan Todorov, *Il nuovo disordine mondiale. Le riflessioni di un cittadino europeo*, Garzanti, Milan, 2003.

4) See, by Alfonso Sabatino, *Il negoziato di adesione per la Turchia, Dove sono i confini dell'Unione Europea?*, & *La crisi dell'Ucraina e il ruolo dell'Unione Europea*, in "Piemonteuropa", 2004, n. 4.

(5) See Luisa Trumellini, *Putin's Russia*, in "The Federalist", 2004, n. 3.

